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ABSTRACT
We examine the effect of guaranteed lowest price clauses (G.L.P.). 
First, we correct the proof of Logan and Lutter’s main result that it is 
the unique equilibrium outcome for firms adopting G.L.P. to charge 
collusive prices in a simultaneous pricing game, if one uses the 
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. Second, 
we extend their argument to a sequential pricing game in which one 
firm chooses its price before the other, given that both firms adopt 
G.L.P. We show that collusive prices is the unique equilibrium outcome 
in this game even without resorting to any stringent refinement like 
the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
1. Introduction
In 1963, G.E. (General Electric) issued a price-book containing information about prices of 
its turbine generators. Shortly thereafter, Westinghouse followed G.E. by publishing a similar 
price-book. In the period, there was no evidence that they kept any contact with each other, 
but they maintained high prices in following years. This case triggered the Department of 
Justice’s new antitrust doctrine arguing that an agreement between firms does not require 
direct explicit communication between them but that the agreement can also be established 
through a public communication. At that time, collusion-facilitating practices such as ‘guar-
anteed lowest price’ clauses (hereafter G.L.P.) began to receive attention in antitrust cases.
In fact, many firms offer consumers lowest-price guarantees in which they promise 
to match any lower price charged by rivals. Also, many authors study the effect of G.L.P., 
especially the possibility that it can facilitate collusion. The intuition is quite clear. If a firm 
cuts its price when both firms adopt G.L.P., it has the effect of lowering the rival firm’s price 
by the same amount. Therefore, firms would have no incentive to lower prices under G.L.P.
Early theoretical studies on G.L.P. include Holt and Scheffman (1987), Belton (1987) 
and Logan and Lutter (1989). Holt and Scheffman (1987) considered several facilitating 
practices jointly, namely G.L.P., Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses (M.F.C.), and public 
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advance notification. Logan and Lutter (1989) considered G.L.P. only. Schnitzer (1994) 
considered G.L.P. and M.F.C. separately. More recently, authors expanded their interests 
beyond ‘meet-the-competition’ clauses (M.C.C.), equivalent to G.L.P., to ‘beat-the-compe-
tition’ clauses (B.C.C.).
In this paper, we will examine the robustness of the collusion-facilitating effect of G.L.P. 
by using Logan and Lutter (1989) as a benchmark model. Logan and Lutter (1989), in their 
interesting paper, argued that the unique equilibrium in the symmetric two stage G.L.P. 
game is for both firms to adopt G.L.P. in the first stage and collusive prices in the second 
stage (Theorem 1). In the proof, they used two arguments. One is that when both firms 
select G.L.P., the set of Nash equilibria in the subgame is EN ≡ {(p, p)|p
N ≤  p ≤  pC} where 
pN is the symmetric Nash price and pC is the symmetric collusive price. The second is that 
the unique (trembling-hand) perfection-like refinement (hereafter, simply trembling-hand 
perfect equilibrium) among them is (pC, pC); Theorem 2. In this paper, we show that their 
arguments have flaws, although the second argument itself is correct. We correct the proof 
of their main result that it is the unique equiibrium outcome for firms adopting G.L.P. to 
charge collusive prices in a simultaneous pricing game. More importantly, we extend their 
argument to a sequential pricing game in which one firm chooses its price before the other, 
given that both firms adopt G.L.P. We show that collusive prices (pC, pC) are the unique 
equilibrium outcome in this game even without resorting to any stringent refinement like 
the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. This implies that the collusion-facilitating nature 
of G.L.P. is robust to the pricing sequence and even strengthened in the sequential pricing 
game, which is more plausible in reality.
Despite the extensive theoretical literature on G.L.P., empirical literature is more limited, 
mainly due to the difficulty in collecting price data before and after introduction of G.L.P. 
To the best of our knowledge, Hess and Gerstner (1991) seems to be the first empirical 
work on this topic. They used price data at supermarkets and showed that G.L.P. relieves 
competition, i.e., concluded that no evidence of cut-throat price competition is found. 
Arbatskaya, Hviid, and Shaffer (2004) showed by using advertised tyre prices that a tyre 
retailer’s own price-matching or price-beating guarantee has no significant effect on the 
retailer’s advertised tyre price, but that the price tends to rise as the percentage of firms 
announcing low-price guarantees increases. Also, Arbatskaya et al. (2004) obtained the result 
that the majority of low-price guarantees are not consistent with their use as a facilitating 
device. Mañez (2006), using price data on U.K. supermarkets, showed that B.C.C. was not 
a collusive device leading to higher prices but an advertising tool to signal the low prices of 
the supermarket. Empirical studies on G.L.P. show its other roles besides facilitating price 
collusion. Moorthy and Zhang (2006) empirically showed that adopting G.L.P. signals a 
low-price positioning, while not adopting G.L.P. signals high-service positioning.
Due to the difficulties in data collection, experimental methods have been also considered 
as an alternative for testing the effect of G.L.P. on prices. Deck and Wilson (2003) is the 
first experimental research on G.L.P. They showed that the G.L.P. pricing algorithm leads to 
higher prices than the undercutting algorithm. Subsequent experimental results of Fatas and 
Mañez (2007), Mago and Pate (2009), and Fatas, Georgantzís, Mañez, and Sabater (2013) 
also strongly support the collusion-enhancing effects of G.L.P.
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2. Simultaneous pricing
We closely follow the model of Logan and Lutter (1989) in which two firms produce dif-
ferentiated goods with identical marginal costs normalised to zero. They consider a two-
stage game between the two firms, where they decide whether or not to adopt G.L.P. in 
the first stage and they select prices in the second stage. In this note, we focus on the case 
where both firms adopt G.L.P. This is the only case in which Logan and Lutter obtained 
the collusive outcome.
Figure 1 provides clear intuition for why prices (p, p) such that p ≤  pN as well as (p, p) 
such that pN ≤  p ≤  pC can be equilibrium outcomes. Consider any non-negative symmetric 
prices (p, p) such that pN ≤  p ≤  pC. If a firm, say Firm 1, slightly lowers its price, it moves 
the new pair of effective prices not to point A but to point A′ on the 45 degree line, because 
it accompanies a fall in the effective price of Firm 2 by the same amount. This makes Firm 1 
worse off, implying that it has no incentive to cut its price. The intuition for a lower profit is 
that a cut in its price does not increase its demand at all, since the price cut is immediately 
and automatically matched by the rival firm. Meanwhile, it has no incentive to raise its 
price, either, because a price increase does not imply moving to point B but bouncing back 
to the original point. A price increase cannot be maintained effectively because it must be 
matched with the lower price by the rival firm. Combining the two arguments together, we 
can see that any such symmetric vector is a Nash equilibrium outcome. Now, consider any 
non-negative symmetric prices (p, p) such that 0 ≤  p < pN. The same logic can be applied. 
Any price cut by a firm is effectively accompanied by a matching price cut by the rival 
firm, so it cannot be profitable. Hence, there will be no incentive to cut its price. Also, any 
unilateral price increase would have no real effect. So, any such price vector is also a Nash 
equilibrium outcome.
Figure 1. the effect of a deviation from nash prices. source: authors.
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}  be the effective price for both firms. That is, p̃ = p
1
 if p1 < p2, 
p̃ = p
2
 if p1 > p2 and p̃ = p1 = p2 if p1 = p2. Note that a firm’s own price is not important to 
its demand as long as it is above the rival’s price. All that matters is the price of the other 
firm. Taking this into account, we can figure out the best response (B.R.) correspondence 
of each firm as in Figure 2.
Proposition 1 The set of Nash equilibria is E.
The proof is immediate from the best-response correspondences in Figure 2. This prop-
osition is important because this result seems to suggest that prices even below Nash prices 
could be supported under G.L.P. If this is the case, G.L.P. can induce not only collusive prices 
higher than Nash prices, but also non-collusive prices lower than Nash prices. That is, the 
anti-competitive implication of G.L.P. becomes ambiguous. However, due to the following 
proposition, it is not possible for G.L.P. to induce lower prices than Nash prices if one uses 
a stronger solution concept.
Proposition 2 (Logan and Lutter) (pC, pC) is the unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of 
this simultaneous pricing game.
In the appendix, we provide a corrected proof of Logan and Lutter by allowing pertur-
bations to prices above pC (up to a certain upper bound p̄).1 The result of Logan and Lutter 
remains unaffected even if we allow more perturbations. Intuitively, this is because pC is still 
the best response to the rival’s higher price (charged with some small probability).
3. Sequential pricing
In this section, we extend the analysis of Logan and Lutter to the sequential model in which 
Firm 1 behaves as a Stackelberg leader by choosing its price earlier than Firm 2.2 We are 
Figure 2. Best-response correspondences. source: authors.
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interested in two issues. First, does G.L.P. still facilitate collusion in this sequential game? 
Second, is there any strategic advantage to either firm? That is, is there any first-mover 
advantage or second-mover advantage?3
The standard solution concept for (complete information) sequential games is the sub-
game perfect equilibrium which employs backward induction. For backward induction, 
consider the best-response correspondence of firm 2 given G.L.P. which is described in 
Figure 3. Firm 1 will choose the price on this B.R. correspondence that yields its maximum 
profit. The next proposition is our second main result.
Proposition 3 (pC, pC) is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the sequential 
price game.
The proof is immediate from B.R. correspondence of Firm 2 and L-shaped iso-profit 
curves of Firm 1 drawn in Figure 3. This proposition has the implication that we do not need 
to resort to a stringent refinement such as trembling-hand perfect equilibrium to obtain the 
unique outcome if firms set prices even slightly in a sequential manner. The intuitive reason 
is that the first mover can initiate coordination on the most preferred outcome among a 
continuum of Nash prices. Although this game has the unique equilibrium outcome, it does 
not mean that this game has the unique equilibrium, since there are continuum of equilibria 
yielding the same outcome. That is, any price vector of E1 ∪ E2 can be a subgame perfect 
equilibrium, although all of them yield the same effective prices (pC, pC). Also, note that 
there is no first mover advantage nor second mover advantage. As long as both firms adopt 
G.L.P., (pC, pC) is a focal point in the sense that pC is the dominant strategy for each firm.
4. Empirical application
To find the effects of G.L.P. clauses on prices empirically, we use the data-set of electronics 
prices collected by Lundberg (2008). In the Swedish electronics market, there are a number 
Figure 3. iso-profit curves of Firm 1. source: authors.
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of firms; El-Gigantel, ONOFF, Siba, Expert, Expert Stormarknad, ELON, Media Market 
and Euronics. Among them, the first two firms (El-Giganten and ONOFF) adopt G.L.P., 
while the others do not. Table 1 describes prices for 13 different products at four firms 
(El-Giganten, ONOFF, Siba and Expert).
Now, our question is whether the average prices of firms adopting G.L.P. (EL-Giganten 
and ONOFF) are higher than the average prices of firms not adopting G.L.P. (Siba and 
Expert). For the comparison, we perform a paired t-test by using the data-set in Table 1. 
Table 2 shows our result of the paired t-test.
From Table 2, we can tell that the average price of El-Giganten and ONOFF adopting 
G.L.P. (4072.9615) is lower than that of Siba and Expert not adopting G.L.P. (4142.5769). 
However, Table 2 also shows that the t-statistic is -1.5870, which belongs to the 95% confi-
dence interval [-2.1788, 2.1788], where 2.1788 is the t critical two-tailed value. This implies 
that the price difference is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This leads 
us to conclude that our theoretical result that G.L.P. does facilitate collusion for higher prices 
is not empirically supported by this data-set, although the general methodology provided in 
this section could be applied to a much larger data-set to tell whether the anti-competitive 
effect of G.L.P. is empirically supported or not.
Table 1. Prices in selected models in El-Giganten, onoFF, siba and expert.
source: Lundberg (2008).
Model El-Giganten ONOFF Siba Expert
sony Ericsson W890i 3149 3390 3490 3590
LG kU990 viewty 3579 3835 3890 3789
nokia 5310 Xpress music 1779 2107 2190 1999
Panasonic th-42PX80E 9690 9788 9736 9699
sony Blu-ray spelare BDP-s300 B 3990 2890 3490 2790
apple ipod classic 80 GB silver 1979 2169 2290 2159
canon Digital iXUs 80 is 2190 2390 2289 2289
canon Eos 450D 18–55 is 7490 7795 7490 7749
canon Eos 400D + 18–55/3.5–5.6 5490 5765 5765 5929
olympus Digitalkamera mY840 1829 1990 1838 1819
sony Davis10 5490 6290 5990 6279
Philips hts6600 4990 4969 4990 5259
cREativE Webcam Live cam optia 379 495 380 529
Table 2. Result of paired t-test.
source: authors.









t critical one-tail 1.7823
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1385
t critical two-tail 2.1788  
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5. Conclusion
In this note, we corrected the proof of Logan and Lutter (1989)’s result, although their 
result still remains valid. We also strengthened their main finding that G.L.P. can facilitate 
collusion by showing that the collusive prices are the unique equilibrium of the sequential 
price game without invoking a stringent refinement like trembling-hand perfection.
Our result has an important policy implication that under G.L.P. practice, equilibrium 
prices cannot be lower than Nash prices, rather they must be higher than Nash prices. 
Therefore, G.L.P. practice is unambiguously facilitating collusion.
Notes
1.  A high price that makes each firm’s demand fall to zero can be an upper bound.
2.  This sequential model is just to demonstrate the robustness of our result. It is often used 
in models of price leadership. See, for example, Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) for price 
leadership.
3.  It is well known from Gal-Or (1985) that there is the second-mover advantage in price 
competition games, whereas there is the first-mover advantage in output competition games.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: Since trembling hand perfection is generally defined for games with finite 
strategy sets, we approximate the game by replacing the uncountable strategy sets with discretised 
finite sets. Let πi(pi, pj) be the profit function of firm i. We assume that there exists p̄ such that for any 
pi ≥ p̄, π(pi, pj) ≤  0 for any pj. Let Δ1 ≡ p
C and Δ
2
≡ p̄ − pC. Then, we can divide the interval [0, pC] 
into nΔ1 subintervals and the interval [p
C
, p̄] into nΔ2 subintervals with equal length for a sufficiently 
large value of n such that both nΔ1 and nΔ2 are integers. Now, there are nΔ subintervals each of which 
have length of 1
n
 where Δ = Δ1 + Δ2. Take any p(k) =
k
n
 for k = 0, 1, 2, ⋯, nΔ. (Note that p(k) = pC if 
k = nΔ1 and p(k) = p̄ if k = nΔ.)
(i) First, we will show that pC is a symmetric (trembling-hand) perfect equilibrium price. Consider 










k,⋯ , nΔ). It is easy 
to see that as ɛk ↓ 0 ∀k, the sequence of totally mixed strategies converges to p
C. We have
since p̃ = p(k) for all k < nΔ1 and p̃ = p
C for all k > nΔ1. For p(k) < p
C, say, p(k0) where k0 < nΔ1, we have
since p̃ = p(k) if k < k0 and p̃ = p(k0) if k ≥  k0. We will compare E(πi(p
C, σ)) and E(πi(p(k0), σ)) term 
by term. Since p(k) is increasing in k and πi(p(k), p(k)) is increasing in pk until p(k) = p
C (for the first-
term comparison) and πi(p
C, pC) ≥  πi(p, p) for all p (for the second- and third-term comparison), we 
can see that E(πi(p
C, σ)) > E(πi(p(k0), σ)), implying that E(πi(p
C, σ)) > E(πi(p(k), σ))for all p(k) < p
C.
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since p̃ = p(k) if k < k1 and p̃ = p(k1) if k ≥  k1. We will compare E(πi(p
C, σ)) and E(πi(p(k1), σ)) term 
by term. Since p(k) is increasing in k and πi(p(k), p(k)) is increasing in pk until p(k) = p
C (for the first-
term comparison) and πi(p
C, pC) ≥  πi(p, p) for all p (for the second- and third-term comparison), we 
can see that E(πi(p
C, σ)) > E(πi(p(k0), σ)), implying that E(πi(p
C, σ)) > E(πi(p(k), σ)) for all p(k) < p
C. 
Since pCis the best response to a sequence of σ that converges to pC, it is the perfect equilibrium.
(ii) Next, we will show that any p(k) < pC cannot be a symmetric perfect equilibrium price. Consider 








k,⋯ , nΔ) for any arbitrary k2 < nΔ1. Clearly, σ
′ 
converges to p(k2) as ɛk ↓ 0. We have
Since pC = argmaxp i(p, p), it is clear that E(πi(p
C, σ′)) > E(πi(p(k2), σ
′)), implying that p(k2) is not a 
best response to σ′. Therefore, p(k2) cannot be a symmetric perfect equilibrium price.
(iii) Finally, it remains to show that any asymmetric price vector (pC, p) for p > pC cannot be a 
perfect equilibrium . It is trivial to see this, because we already showed in (i) that pC (not any p > pC) 
is the best response to a sequence of σ defined in (i), implying that (pC, p) for p ≠ pC cannot be a 






















𝜀k𝜋i(p(k), p(k)) + (1 −
∑
k≠k
2
𝜀k)𝜋i(p(k2), p(k2))
+
∑
k
2
<k<nΔ
1
𝜀k𝜋i(p(k2), p(k2)) +
∑
k≥nΔ
1
𝜀k𝜋i(p
C
, pC).
